NAPAS National Association of Protection & Advocacy systems
May 26, 2005
Mr. Alexander Acosta, Assistant Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
P.O. Box 1032
Merrifield, VA 22116-1032
CRT Docket No. 2004-DRS01
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability
Via Electronic Filing & First Class Mail
Dear Mr. Acosta:
In its Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (ANPRM), the Department of Justice requested comments regarding adopting Parts I and III of the revised guidelines implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 (ABA) published by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) on July 23, 2004.
Question 1. What should be the effective date of the proposed revised ADA Standards (6, 12 or 18 months)?
NAPAS urges the Department to use the six month period. To the extent that any changes would impact a construction project presently pending, the Department should not apply any particular safe harbor. The Department could allow a process whereby any particular construction project could request an extension to 12 months or 18 months for some verified reason. This would permit flexibility for legitimate situations without undue delay of the effective date for the regulations for all projects.
Question 2. Identify any facilities for which the current “triggering events” might prove unworkable
Facilities in which “first use” may work better than the current “triggering events” include facilities not requiring building permits, such as swimming pools, recreation facilities, Christmas tree lots, construction and sales trailers and firework stands.
Question 3. Should the Department provide any sort of safe harbor?
NAPAS opposes the “Option I” “safe harbor for compliant elements” proposal for a number of reasons. First, it is unclear that any changes in ADAAG will have a significant financial impact on existing facilities. Many of the changes are clarifications rather than new measurements or specifications. For the few elements that actually include different specifications (the example given in the ANPRM concerns lowering the maximum height of light switches from 54 to 48 inches), there are typically other ways to comply without substantial retrofitting expense. Again, to use the example in the ANPRM, low-cost light switch extension handles are available.
NAPAS also opposes the “safe harbor” proposal as unnecessarily complicated. It will perpetuate two sets of Standards, and make any compliance assessment of a particular accommodation more difficult. In fact, it sets a precedent for any future iterations of ADAAG that could well result in having to consult many more than two different Standards. The establishment of this precedent is particularly troubling, as it would result in “museums of inaccessibility” – buildings with access flaws frozen in place at various different times in the (perhaps distant) past.
Question 4. Reducing or exempting specified requirements. (a) Option II develop an alternative set of reduced scoping requirements for the barrier removal obligation? (b) Option III exempt certain scoping and technical requirements in the revised ADA standards that will not be required for barrier removal.
Adults and children with disabilities continue to encounter barriers that impede their ability to access buildings and activities, even with the current ADA Standards, because these regulations only have minimum protections regarding barrier removal.
NAPAS disagrees with the idea in “Option II” of reducing the scoping requirements for some of the new or changed requirements as they are applied to existing facilities because it is not apparent that it is required, it is overly complicated and it is adequately dealt with in the existing “readily achievable” analysis.”
Often, people with disabilities are forced to enter public accommodations from only one means of access which can be very difficult due to distance. The current ADA Standards require a swimming pool over 300 feet in perimeter to have two accessible means of entry to the pool. A person who has a mobility disability, but who may not use a wheelchair, could have great difficulty accessing a pool that has only one accessible entry. For example: AC has cerebral palsy. AC can ambulate short distances on his crutches, but to ambulate long distances (which 300 feet would qualify) AC must use a wheelchair. If AC has to use his wheelchair, AC must have someone accompany him to the pool (to help him get his wheelchair out of the car). If AC uses his crutches, AC can move around independently.
Under Option III, the Department gives as a possible example for an exemption, the requirement that handrails on stairs must meet accessibility requirements even in buildings with elevator access. This is discriminatory as well. What happens when the elevator is not working properly or is being repaired? What about a person with a disability that chooses to use the stairs as a form of exercise rather than taking the elevator? Handrails on stairs still need to meet accessibility requirements to address situations when an elevator is unusable.
NAPAS also strongly disagrees with the Option III approach that would label certain new or revised technical requirements as “inappropriate for barrier removal,” and thus not required. This approach dooms future ADAAG improvement – no matter how important it may be to access – simply because there is an expense associated with it. No other ADAAG requirement is ignored; instead, individual compliance with other requirements simply depends on how difficult and expensive it is to achieve in a particular case. In fact, it is this last point that suggests a more appropriate way to factor in expense.
To the extent that the Department’s research actually documents the likelihood of real-life examples of serious financial burdens as a result of the new Standards, a better way to factor this in would be to specify that one factor to consider in determining whether the removal of a particular barrier is “readily achievable” is the expense the accommodation had previously incurred to comply with earlier, superseded Standards.
Question 6. To what extent should golf courses be required to make accessible golf cars available to people with disabilities?
NAPAS supports requiring golf courses to provide golf carts that are readily accessible to and usable by people with disabilities. This would allow people with disabilities to play golf in the same manner as golfers without disabilities. Furthermore, it would not cause a fundamental alteration to the program, service or activity of the golf course. Modified golf carts include hand controls, swivel stand-up seat, transfer bars, and assistive device holders to accommodate the needs of people with mobility impairments.
After Question 6, Coverage of Homeless Shelters, Halfway Houses, Transient Group Homes, and Other Social Service Establishments
The revisions to the ADAAG for transient lodging facilities deleted Section 9.5 of the 1991 ADAAG which established scoping and technical requirements for homeless shelters, group homes and similar social service establishments. To fill this gap, the Department stated that it anticipated making homeless shelters and related facilities subject to the requirements for Residential Facilities (2004 ADAAG, § 233) because shelters are subject to the ADA due to the nature of the services they provide, not the duration of the services. The Department recognized that program participants may be housed on either a short-term or long-term basis in facilities such as shelters, halfway houses and group homes.
NAPAS does not object to this approach but notes two areas of concern. First, the 2004 revised ADAAG Section 106.5 contains definitions of “Residential Dwelling Unit” as “a unit intended to be used as a residence, that is primarily long-term in nature.” Similarly, “Transient Lodging” is defined as “A building or facility containing one or more guest room(s) for sleeping that provides accommodations that are primarily short-term in nature” (emphasis added). This language may create confusion when applied to homeless shelters, group homes and similar social services establishments because such establishments serve people for varying lengths of time, from overnight to several years. Therefore, NAPAS suggests either deleting the long term and short term language from the definitions or adding a section in the definitions to reflect the different nature of homeless shelters, group homes and similar social service establishments. Second, applying the ADAAG scoping and technical requirements for Residential Facilities in ADAAG § 233 to homeless shelters, group homes and similar social services establishments may not address the fact that some of these facilities are less like “residential dwelling units” and are more like “transient lodging” containing multiple guest rooms for sleeping or having communal dormitory-style sleeping arrangements.
Thus, NAPAS urges the Department to amend the definitions in the regulations to remove any possible confusion to ensure that all facilities containing homeless shelters, halfway houses, transient group homes, and other social service establishments are properly covered under the ADAAG.
If the Department modifies its current ADA standards to permit facilities like homeless shelters, halfway houses, transient group homes, and other social service establishments to be designed in compliance with the requirements applicable to residential dwelling units under Section 233 some amendments will be necessary. The regulations need be revised to ensure that homeless shelters, halfway houses, transient group homes, and other social service establishments that have multiple guest rooms or have guest rooms with more than 25 beds meet the same requirements as transient lodging guest rooms under Section 224. The regulations need to include the requirements to have appropriate entrances, doors and doorways, to have appropriate numbers of rooms with mobility features and in guest rooms having more than 25 beds, to have 5 percent minimum of the beds shall have clear floor space complying with 806.2.3. The regulations must also ensure that homeless shelters, halfway houses, transient group homes, and other social service establishments are covered by the same Dispersion requirement as found in Section 224.5 for transient lodging facilities.
Question 7. Application of ADA Standards and ADA to Free-Standing Equipment.
NAPAS strongly urges the Department to adopt ADA regulations that contain specific language about the acquisition and use of mobile, portable and other free-standing equipment used by covered entities to provide services. People with disabilities need clear accessibility standards to ensure “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations” of retail stores and other public places. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
While the current ADA standards contain detailed design specifications for a variety of architectural elements, they do not specifically address free-standing equipment but should address free-standing equipment to ensure full access. Neither the ADA nor its implementing regulations contain specific requirements for spacing of moveable display units and the issue is thus governed by the more general “readily achievable” standard of the ADA. See, Lieber v. Macy’s West, 80 F. Supp.2d 1065, 1078 (1999).
The problem with applying the “readily achievable” standard to free-standing equipment is that businesses may argue that the rearrangement is not readily achievable to the extent that it results in a significant loss of selling and/or serving space. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(a)(iv); 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(f). These arguments are speculative and courts need more guidance in order to determine what is accessible.
The “readily achievable” standard is inadequate because it requires an examination of the speculative financial impact of rearranging displays or service areas. As a practical matter, this allows a place of public accommodation to control the analysis of the effect of even minor rearrangements on inventory, service, sales, profits, cash flow, supply chain and other business factors. In this context, the “readily achievable” analysis mandates that people with disabilities have access to company financial data and expert witnesses. This burden is unreasonable for people who merely want independent access to merchandise, service or entertainment.
In newly constructed and altered facilities, free-standing equipment should be displayed to allow self-service by customers. Free-standing equipment should also be on accessible routes to be clearly defined in the Standards. NAPAS urges setting standards for access to free-standing equipment to ensure non-discriminatory use, shopping and entertainment. Businesses that do not provide accessible routes to merchandise and services increase discrimination between people who have disabilities and those who do not.
When people with disabilities have no access to specific items for which they are searching, they are unable to shop (i.e., browse, compare items, review quality and coordinate pieces before buying). Relying on sales staff to retrieve merchandise from inaccessible fixtures is not equal access.
When people with disabilities have no way to access free-standing equipment such as ATMs, vending machines, informational kiosks or video games, they have no use of them. Again, the “readily achievable” standard imposes too high a burden for the average consumer to allow independent, non-discriminatory and equal access to services.
NAPAS urges the Department to adopt regulations to guarantee people with disabilities access to free-standing equipment, such as vending machines, video-arcade machines, informational kiosks, free-standing ATMs, as well as for display racks and furniture.
Question 8. Stadium-Style Seating
As the Department notes in its prefatory comments to Question 8, the issue of accessible seating in stadium-style movie theaters has been one of the most contentious areas of Title III enforcement efforts. One of the central arguments made by the movie industry has been that there was insufficient guidance contained within the ADAAG. In addition, some of the courts that have analyzed the accessible seating requirements as applied to stadium-style seating have had concerns as to whether there has been sufficient guidance. Given the time and effort expended to clarify the accessibility requirements through litigation and settlements, NAPAS believes it is in the interest of all parties for there to be as much and as clear guidance as possible. Thus, in answer to the Department’s first question, because of the set of issues that are peculiar to stadium-style movie theaters, and the need for detailed guidance, NAPAS strongly urges the Department to promulgate a regulation specifically relating to these types of movie theaters.
As to the second part of the issue, the Department should not simply adopt regulations that addressed viewing angle only. That would allow movie theaters to argue that there is still insufficient guidance on the design and construction of stadium-style movie theaters. Instead, the Department should also provide greater guidance and clarity on alternative distance from the screen, and on use of the viewing angle/percentile approach.
Concerning the question of how to define the “stadium” section of a stadium-style theater, the Department should track the language of its own settlements with a large movie chain, by defining “stadium section” as “that portion of the auditorium where the seats are affixed to risers, and, where each row of stadium seating is elevated above the row immediately ahead of it and is accessed by stepped, rather than sloped, aisles.” If need be, “riser” could be defined as “an elevated tier (usually six to eighteen inches) in an auditorium on which seats are affixed to the auditorium floor.”
Finally, NAPAS wishes to reiterate the importance of the Department affirmatively promulgating new rules in the area of stadium-style movie theaters. Several of the courts that have ruled favorably on the Department’s interpretation of Section 4.33.3 as applied to stadium-style movie theaters have been critical of the Department’s failure to promulgate accessibility requirements that specifically apply to these types of movie theaters. See e.g., United States v. Hoyts Cinema Corp., 256 F.Supp.2d 73, 92-93 (D. Mass. 2003). As a result of that concern, at least one court limited the relief it ordered. Id. As that court noted, “the best way to bring about nationwide changes in the configuration of stadium-style theaters is to promulgate a new rule after a period of notice and comment.” Id. For all of these reasons, it is essential that the Department use this opportunity to respond to any perceived tardiness in promulgating this important and needed guidance in stadium-style movie theater accessibility, and to do so with as much detailed guidance as possible.
After Question 8, in Part III. Miscellaneous Matters, under the heading entitled “Title II Complaints, Complaint Investigation”
In Part III of the ANPRM, the Department states that it will be addressing issues relating to the investigation of Title II complaints. In particular, the Department intends to provide for agency “discretion to prioritize these complaints.” NAPAS does not oppose this plan. Instead, NAPAS requests that any action in this regard include clarification that agency action rejecting a complaint – whether under a new “triage” system or otherwise – does not prejudice the claimant’s right to seek redress in court.
NAPAS notes, for example, that for Title I complaints, the EEOC has adopted a “Priority Charge Handling Procedure,” to operate as such a “triage” system. But even when rejecting a charge of discrimination (and issuing a so-called “no cause” finding), the agency states: “Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This does not certify that the respondent is in compliance with the statutes.”
To give another example, when the Justice Department issues a Right to Sue in ADA employment discrimination claims filed against public entities, it states: “It has been determined that the Department of Justice will not file suit on the above-referenced charge of discrimination that was referred to us by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This should not be taken to mean that the Department of Justice has made a judgment as to whether or not your charge is meritorious.”
It is particularly important, when denying a full investigation of a Title II complaint, that the Department states that its decision is not to be taken as evidence that no Title II violation existed.
After Question 8, in Part III. Miscellaneous Matters, in the Section entitled AExhaustion of Administrative Remedies@ concerning the effect of the Prison Reform Litigation Act (PLRA)
In the ANPRM the Department impermissibly seeks to impose an additional requirement regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies on prisoners challenging unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability in correctional facilities. The Department asserts that the Prison Reform Litigation Act (PRLA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, provides that individuals seeking to challenge prison conditions under “any * * * Federal law” are required to first exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available.” The Department then notes that ADA Title II allows for the filing of Title II administrative complaints with the Department. The Department’s revised regulation “will provide that in order to exhaust administrative remedies as required under the PRLA, prisoners alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of disability under Title II will be required to file an administrative complaint with the Department prior to filing suit in court.” This is contrary to both the PRLA and the ADA.
First, this would be contrary to the ADA because Title II of the ADA imposes no exhaustion requirement (in contrast to Title I). The proposed regulation is also contrary to the PRLA because that stature only requires exhaustion of available internal prison grievance systems prior to filing a lawsuit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. See also, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-525 (2002). “Beyond doubt, Congress enacted § 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits; to this purpose, Congress afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 - 25 (emphasis added).
The legislative history of the PLRA supports the conclusion that Congress intended the PLRA to require exhaustion of the prison grievance system only. Senator Kyl, one of the co-sponsors of the PLRA stated:
Mr. President, I join Senator Dole in introducing the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. This bill will deter frivolous inmate lawsuits. . . . Section 7 will make the exhaustion of administrative remedies mandatory. Many prisoner cases seek relief for matters that are relatively minor and for which the prison grievance system would provide an adequate remedy.
141 Cong. Rec. S7526‑7527 (May 25, 1995) (emphasis added), cited in Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1070 (11th Cir 1998).
The Department states that it wishes to ensure that the requirement to file a Title II Complaint with the Department will not be a bar for prisoners with disabilities seeking redress of their grievances in court. Thus, the Department proposes that for purposes of the PRLA, a complainant would be deemed to have successfully exhausted administrative remedies and would be permitted to file in court if the Department takes no action on the case within a 60-day administrative period. But that does not remedy the above-cited problems.
By imposing the requirement to file a Title II complaint with the Department, prisoners would have to exhaust two administrative complaints, one with the corrections facility and a second with the Department. The Department also admits that it will be impossible for it to investigate each complaint. It seeks to remedy that problem by deeming successful exhaustion if there is no action in 60 days. Nevertheless, all prisoners with disabilities will be subject to an additional and unwarranted delay before they are permitted to file in court. Any ADA Title II complaints that are accepted for investigation will be subject to further delays while the Department undertakes an investigation. Whether the delay is for 60 days or longer, the result is unlawful discrimination against prisoners with disabilities, as compared to prisoners without disabilities who file claims in federal court not subject to this double exhaustion requirement.
Because Title II of the ADA does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, and because the PLRA does not require exhaustion of remedies other than internal prison grievance procedures, the Department’s plan as set forth in the ANPRM would violate both statutes. Accordingly, NAPAS urges the Department omit any requirement that prisoners file a Title II complaint with the Department before being permitted to file suit in any Title II ADA claim.
Question 9. Costs and benefits of applying new and changed specifications to existing facilities under readily achievable barrier removal
Many “existing” facilities have not yet had renovations or alterations sufficient to trigger the “new construction” requirements. NAPAS believes the “readily achievable” standard sufficiently balances the needs of people with disabilities and the economic impact of dealing with those needs.
Question 10. Economic Impact on Covered Small Entities
The purpose of Title III of the ADA is to prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability by public accommodations. These standards already address the economic impact for covered small entities and allow exemptions under the “readily achievable” barrier removal standard.
The new accessibility standards will apply to newly constructed and altered facilities, 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a), but this should have little economic impact. See, 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App B § 36.304 (“accessibility can be conveniently and economically incorporated in the initial stages of design and construction.”) American with Disabilities Act - Questions and Answers. (DOJ May 2002). (“Cost of incorporating accessibility features is less than one percent of construction costs.”) For existing facilities, architectural barriers are required to be removed where it is “readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. §12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). “Readily achievable” means easily accomplished without much expense or difficulty. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The factors to be considered include: (1) the nature and cost; (2) the overall financial resources of the site and the effect on expenses and resources; (3) the fiscal relationship of the entity and any parent corporations; (4) if applicable, parent corporations’ overall fiscal resources and (5) if a parent corporation exists, its composition and structure. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. The question of what is readily achievable primarily rests on the nature and cost of the barrier removal and the resources of the public accommodations involved. Hence, NAPAS believes any questions of costs for covered small entities have already been addressed.
Question 11. The Department is considering excluding as a barrier removal obligation for existing facilities, if it selects Option II under Question 4, above, the requirement at ADAAG 210 that accessible handrails be added to stairs in buildings with elevators.
NAPAS recommends that the Department not exclude as a barrier removal obligation for existing facilities the ADAAG 210 requirement that accessible handrails be added to stairs in buildings with elevators.
Many people with disabilities rely heavily on handrails to maintain balance and prevent serious falls. Many individuals brace their forearms between supports (i.e. handrails) and walls to give them more leverage and stability in maintaining balance.
However, handrails are not only important for support and stability ascending and descending stairs, but they provide critical visual cues that a stairway is near. Handrails are beneficial for many people with disabilities, including those with visual impairments, traumatic brain injury (TBI), and cognitive impairments. A reasonable person will perceive a stairway more readily when there is an adjacent handrail to catch his or her attention.
Question 19. Incremental benefit of having comparable vanity space in accessible hotel rooms
The Department has sought information about the incremental benefit of having comparable vanity space in accessible hotel guest toilet or bathing rooms. NAPAS believes that having comparable vanity space is precisely within Title III’s mandate to provide an equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits, programs or services of a public accommodation.
To illustrate, consider for a moment how willing most people without disabilities would be to stay in a hotel room which provided little or no vanity space. It is a fair assumption that faced with such a choice, most people would not choose to return to such an establishment. Designers of hotels understand that fundamental fact, and of course they would not seriously consider omitting such an important feature in a standard hotel room. Why then should a person with a disability who needs an accessible room be forced to endure such a choice? There really would be no good reason to do so, unless there was some sort of misguided notion of, “which do you want – access or a vanity?” No one should be forced to make this choice and the law should not tolerate this forced choice.
In addition, consider for a moment the nature of the “inconvenience” resulting from such an omission. In a standard room, a person without a disability might need the vanity for placing their soaps, hair products, or other toiletries. In contrast, a person with a disability who needs an accessible bathroom might need the vanity space for placing more critically important self-care products, such as a catheter, rubber gloves or medications, to name just a few examples. Having to place such items on the floor is not a mere “inconvenience” but instead might very well present real health concerns.
Vanity space is provided in hotel rooms because patrons find them to be useful. Under the most fundamental notion of equal opportunity to enjoy the features of a public accommodation, NAPAS believes there can be little support for the notion that it is fair or appropriate to deny this accommodation to people with disabilities.
Question 26. Incremental Benefit of On-Off Switch in Accessible Shower
In response to the Department’s question seeking information on the incremental benefit of having an on-off switch in an accessible shower compartment of a hospital or long term care facility, NAPAS believes that there would be a significant benefit to people with disabilities having such a switch. It would provide a greater degree of independence for people with disabilities, and would be an important component of providing an equal opportunity to benefit from the programs, benefits or services of a hospital or long-term care facility. The on-off switch provides a person with a disability a wider range of choices. The person would be able to set the proper water temperature and be fully situated before turning on the water.
Fundamentally, the issue is one of independence. The on-off switch enables the person with a disability to access the accessible shower without requiring the assistance of a staff person. As another example, assume that the person with a disability uses a wheelchair, but is receiving medical services for a different medical condition, such as a torn rotator cuff. That person can only use one limb to shower. If there is an on-off switch, the person can still do the shower independently without the assistance of an aide, but otherwise, the person with a disability would not be able to shower independently.
Posing Question 26 suggests the implicit assumption that such a switch is not be needed because a person with a disability at such a facility would have a nurse or aide available. Any such assumption is incorrect. First, in a time when staff reductions at hospital and long-term care facilities are common, staff are often not available. Even if staff might be available, there are often insufficient personnel to allow patients to receive the needed assistance to be able to bathe at the same frequency that the patient had routinely done at their own home. Again, having the switch would enable the person greater independence by allowing the person to bath when the patient wishes.
Question 42. Incremental benefit of transfer devices available for use with existing amusement rides
Adults and children with disabilities continue to be denied equal access in amusement rides and activities. NAPAS is pleased with the adoption of the new requirement at ADAAG 234.3 which will allow children and adults with disabilities to have increased choices to participate in thrilling experiences on newly designed and constructed rides. Currently, large park and recreation areas such as Walt Disney World, Universal Studios, and Six Flags Theme Parks continue to explore new technology and provide ways for people with physical disabilities to experience thrill rides, shows, and other activities and events. These parks have the financial capability, as well as the modern technology to allow people with disabilities to participate.
However, smaller parks and amusement attractions continue to claim that the costs associated with barrier removal to access existing amusement rides and attractions are not cost effective and therefore a burden which they cannot afford. This is simply not true. If these amusement park owners and developers would consult with people with disabilities, alternatives could be implemented to allow full participation.
Having transfer devices available on existing amusement park rides would greatly increase access for people with disabilities to the full range of amusement park facilities. In addition to transfer devices, NAPAS urges the Department to include other means to allow an equal opportunity for adults and children with disabilities to participate in a wider range of existing amusement rides.
For example: W.C., a four year old child with cerebral palsy wanted to ride the “kiddie” motorcycle ride at a small theme park in Alabama. The operator of the ride refused to let W.C. ride the motorcycle ride because the child used a wheelchair. When the child’s mother asked if the mother could ride with the child, the child was still refused. When the child’s mother asked if another child could ride the motorcycle with W.C., the operator said no. All the motorcycle ride would have needed was a stronger support belt or adaptive insert to allow the child to ride. At this same park, W.C. was not able to ride the “kiddie” train. The train had no seat belt. W.C. could have ridden if there had been an adequate seat/harness belt in place, which would be “readily achievable” for this ride.
Question 45. Comments on DOJ=s consideration of reducing the number of accessible entries for certain pools if it follows Option II, Q. 4
NAPAS believes the requirement should remain unchanged. Since people without disabilities may enter the pool at any point, two accessible entry points for people with disabilities is fair. An additional concern is for people with disabilities having adequate means of exiting the pool in the event of an emergency or if they become tired. Reducing the number of accessible entries from two to one would reduce safe access for people with disabilities.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment and look forward to reviewing the Proposed Rules.
Respectfully Submitted,
Kenneth S. Shiotani
Senior Staff Attorney
National Association of Protection and Advocacy, Inc. (NAPAS)
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